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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                        _________________ 
 
Rosenn, Circuit Judge. 
 
              This appeal presents basic but serious questions 
pertaining to essential procedures to obtain personal 
jurisdiction over defendants in a civil action filed in a federal 
district court.  The issues raised not only pertain to the 
sufficiency of the process to obtain personal jurisdiction but 
also to the effective service of process.  The United States 
District Court for the District of Delaware dismissed the 
complaint and directed the Clerk to enter judgment for the 
defendants.  The plaintiff timely appealed.  We affirm. 
 
                                I. 
         Caroline P. Ayres, the plaintiff, has been a licensed 
Delaware attorney since 1984.  Jacobs & Crumplar, P.A., a 
Wilmington, Delaware law firm, employed her as an associate from 
December 1988 until August 1993 when they terminated her.  On 
December 7, 1994, the plaintiff filed a complaint pro se, 
challenging the termination of her employment by the defendants, 
Jacobs & Crumplar, and its individual partners.  She did not 
request the Clerk of the Court to issue a signed summons with a 
seal of the court affixed thereto, but she obtained copies of 
summonses, filled in the name and address of defendants, and on 
December 29, 1994, she had a process server agency serve the 
complaints and the unsigned summons on each of the defendants.  
Service was accomplished by the process server by leaving the 
documents with the office manager, Donna Dobbs, of Jacobs & 
Crumplar.  The plaintiff duly filed proofs of service. 
         On January 18, 1995, the defendants filed their answer 
and moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed. 
R. Civ. P.) 12(b)(4) and (5).  The court initially denied the 
motion because the defendants failed to support it with a brief 
as required by the Local Rules.  The parties then proceeded with 
discovery.  On July 31, 1995 (within the September 12, 1995 
deadline fixed by the court for depositive motions), the 
defendants renewed their motion to dismiss, this time filing a 
supporting brief as required by the Local Rules.  The court 
stayed discovery and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. 
         In their motion, the defendants move to dismiss on two 
separate and distinct grounds.  First, they claim a deficiency in 
process due to the plaintiff's failure to obtain the Clerk's 
signature on the summonses and to have the seal of the court 
affixed.  Second, they maintain that the office manager at Jacobs 
& Crumplar had no authority to accept service on behalf of a 
professional association or the individuals and the service, 
therefore, was defective.  The district court concluded that the 
plaintiff had provided no excuse for her failure to comply with 
the Rule relating to service "other than the fact that she simply 
did not think the `technical niceties' of service of process 
important."  The court found that "such disregard for the Rules 
is inexcusable.  Under the circumstances, the court can find no 
justification for permitting an amendment to the summons or for 
extending the deadline for service."  The court further found 
that the defendants had not waived their service and process 
defenses and dismissed the action.  The plaintiff timely 
appealed. 
 
                               II. 
         On appeal, the plaintiff reiterates the arguments she 
submitted to the district court.  In substance, she contends that 
the court erred in not finding that the defendants had waived all 
claims to failed process and that she had made a good faith 
effort to serve the defendants.  She asserts that she had 
effectuated valid service on the individual defendants by serving 
them "at their usual place of abode, their law firm," and that 
the court erred in not finding that service upon the professional 
association was perfected by serving its office manager.  She 
further contends that the district court erred in not granting 
leave for reservice upon the defendants and in not following the 
general rule that Fed. R. Civ. P. (4)(m) requires dismissal only 
where there is a complete lack of service on the defendant. 
         Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1) requires that service on a 
corporation be to "an officer, a managing or general agent, or to 
any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive 
service of process . . .."  In this case, the documents were 
delivered to the firm's office manager; the plaintiff does not 
dispute that the office manager does not, in actuality, fall into 
any of these categories. 
         Plaintiff, rather, relies on two arguments:  That the 
office manager had apparent authority to accept process, and 
that, in any event, the purpose of the service rule (i.e., to 
ensure notice) had been fulfilled.  The district court properly 
disposes of the first argument by noting that as plaintiff had 
been employed at the firm and knew or should have known that the 
office manager lacked actual authority, she was not in a position 
to rely on apparent authority.  In regard to the second point, we 
note that although it is true that one of the purposes of the 
rules regarding service of process is to provide notice, Grand 
Entertainment Group Ltd. v. Star Media Sales Inc., 988 F.2d. 476, 
486 (3rd Cir. 1983), this court has made clear that "notice 
cannot by itself validate an otherwise defective service."  Id.at 492. 
         The district court also rejected plaintiff's contention 
that the defendants waived their service and process defenses by 
not presenting them sufficiently clearly and in a timely manner 
(thereby "sandbagging plaintiff" by proceeding with discovery).  
The district court properly found plaintiff's position to be 
contrary to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and unsupported 
by precedent. 
         The defendants included in their January 18, 1995 
answer a motion to dismiss based in part on Rule 12(b)(4) and 
(5).  Although the motion was rejected because of the defendants' 
failure to append a brief (as required by local court rules), the 
motion was re-submitted within the requisite period set by the 
court, supported by brief, and served to put the plaintiff on 
notice that service and process had been improper.  Plaintiff 
could have, but did not, validly effectuate service within the 
120-day deadline. 
         The court properly rejected the plaintiff's argument 
that the defendants have waived their defenses by engaging in 
discovery and attending scheduling conferences.  As the 
defendants point out, when confronted with an 18-count complaint 
seeking $28 million in relief, it is prudent to proceed with 
one's case while awaiting determination of motions to dismiss. 
         We, furthermore, see no merit in the plaintiff's 
contention that the district court erred in refusing to extend 
the 120-day period for service of process.   
         Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) provides: 
         If service of the summons and complaint is 
         not made upon a defendant within 120 days 
         after the filing of the complaint, the court 
         . . . shall dismiss the action without 
         prejudice . . . or direct that service be 
         effected within a specified time; provided 
         that if the plaintiff shows good cause for 
         the failure, the court shall extend the time 
         for service for an appropriate period. 
 
In this circuit, the district court's determination with respect 
to good cause is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Braxton v. 
United States, 817 F.2d. 238, 242 (3d Cir. 1987).  The district 
court's determination in this case (that plaintiff's disregard 
for what she considered the "technical niceties" of service of 
process, see supra p. 3, does not constitute good cause) is in 
line with the precedent of this court.  See, e.g., Petrucelli v. 
Bohringer & Ratzinger, 46 F.3d 1298, 1307 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(inadvertence, "half-hearted" efforts, and misplaced reliance 
does not constitute good cause). 
 
                               III. 
         We turn now to the sufficiency of the process.  We 
believe that a careful analysis of the law pertaining to the 
issuance and function of the summons would have saved the parties 
considerable time and discovery and spared judicial resources.  
The issuance of a summons signed by the Clerk, with the seal of 
the Court, and the time designated within which defendant is 
required to appear and attend, are essential elements of the 
court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant.  "A summons is 
process because its service subjects the person served to the 
court's jurisdiction, which is necessary to validate a judgment 
that the court might render against the person."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
4 28 U.S.C.A. Practice Commentary C4-4 (1992 & Supp. 1996). 
         In the instant case, the plaintiff never requested the 
Clerk to issue a summons nor did he.  The Clerk neither signed it 
nor affixed the seal of the Court as required by Rule 4.  The 
plaintiff avers in her affidavit that she prepared the summons in 
this action and took "a copy of the summons supplied by the Clerk 
of this court and filled in the name and address . . . for each 
defendant."  She then engaged a process server and plaintiff 
appeared in the Clerk's office the next day to file the proofs of 
service.  A staff person called to her attention without other 
comment that the summons did not contain the Clerk's signature 
and docketed the return. 
         The failure of a plaintiff to obtain valid process from 
the court to provide it with personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant in a civil case is fatal to the plaintiff's case.  The 
parties cannot waive a void summons.  A district court must not 
only have subject matter jurisdiction over the litigation before 
it, but also personal jurisdiction over the defendants.  A court 
may not go through the sterile exercise of acting in a vacuum to 
adjudicate a legal dispute.  It must have parties as well as an 
actual controversy.  In order to impose personal liability upon a 
defendant or obligate him or her in favor of a plaintiff, a court 
must be vested with jurisdiction over the parties as well as 
subject matter jurisdiction.  Notice of a claim is not 
sufficient.   
         It is fundamental that before a court may 
         impose upon a defendant a personal liability 
         or obligation in favor of the plaintiff or 
         may extinguish a personal right of the 
         defendant it must have first obtained 
         jurisdiction over the person of the 
         defendant.   
 
Lohman v. Lohman, 626 A.2d. 384, 390 (Md. 1993). 
         Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 sets forth the procedure by which a 
court obtains personal jurisdiction over the defendant.  Rule 
4(a) specifically provides in pertinent part:  "The summons shall 
be signed by the Clerk, [and] under the seal of the court."  As 
the Commentaries to the Rule point out, the Rule is comprehensive 
and "a mistake in its use can be fatal."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 28 
U.S.C.A. Practice Commentary C4-1 (1992 & Supp. 1996).  The 
process is a two-step procedure:  first, a complaint must be 
filed with the Clerk of the Court where the Clerk issues a 
summons to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney who shall be 
responsible for service and, second, the summons and a copy of 
the complaint must be effectively and timely served upon the 
defendant.  Requiring the Clerk to sign and issue the summons  
assures the defendant that the process is valid and enables the 
Clerk to collect whatever filing fees are required.  
         A summons which is not signed and sealed by the Clerk 
of the Court does not confer personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant.  2 James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 4.05 (2d 
ed. 1996) ("Under Rule 4(b) only the clerk may issue the summons 
. . . [A] summons issued by the plaintiff's attorney is a 
nullity."); see also 4a Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1084 (2d ed. 1987).  Upon proper 
motion, or if the defendant raises the matter in the responsive 
pleading, such suit should be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(2).  Thus, under such circumstances, it becomes unnecessary 
for the district courts to consider such questions as whether 
service was properly made, or whether an extension to the 120-day 
service period should be granted under Rule 4(m).  Nor is it 
necessary for the district court to characterize such improper 
issuance as showing a flagrant disregard for the rules.  That 
sort of analysis is useful in determining under Rule 4(m) whether 
plaintiffs had good cause for their failure to make service 
within 120 days, but serves no purpose here. 
 
                               IV. 
         In sum, we hold that a summons not issued and signed by 
the Clerk with the seal of the court affixed thereto fails to 
confer personal jurisdiction over a defendant even if properly 
served.  We further hold that a summons when properly issued is 
not effective in conferring personal jurisdiction upon a 
partnership or individual if it is not served in accordance with 
Rule 4 of the Fed. R. Civ. P. unless service has been effectively 
waived.  In this instance, there was no such waiver. 
         Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be 
affirmed.  Costs taxed against the appellant. 
 
 
 
